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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Klein's Claim that His Right's 
Were Violated and Guilty Plea Infirm when the State Failed to Disclose Impeachment 
Evidence Regarding the Credibility and Reliability of Fred Rice 
In his Opening BriefMr. Klein explained how the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction claim for relief because the State's failure to disclose Brady 
material violated his rights under the Fifth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, as well as Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. In response the State argues it 
was not required to disclose the Brady material regarding Fred Rice prior to entering into a plea 
agreement with Mr. Klein because the United States Constitution does not require the disclosure 
of impeachment evidence absent a trial. The State also attempts to argue that Mr. Klein was not 
prejudiced by the State's failure to produce this evidence. Finally, the State argues the Custer 
County prosecuting attorney did not know Fred Rice's credibility had been tarnished and 
therefore the State had no duty to disclose this information. 
Relying on United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) and its progeny, the State asserts it 
was not required to disclose the impeachment evidence regarding Fred Rice prior to entering into 
a plea agreement with Mr. Klein. As explained in his opening brief, the circumstances here, 
where Mr. Klein entered an Alford plea, are much different and distinguishable from Ruiz. 1 As 
1 The State asserts Mr. Klein should be forbidden from explaining how Ruiz is distinguishable 
because this argument was not raised below. Brief of Respondent, p. 8. Neither party in their 
opposing motions for summary judgment referenced or cited Ruiz. The district court referenced 
Ruiz for the first time in its Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Summary Dismissal ("Memorandum Decision") filed on August 15,2012. R. Vol. 2, 
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previously explained by Mr. Klein, when a defendant lacks conclusive knowledge of his guilt or 
innocence, as is the case here, the lack of pre-plea disclosure of Brady material is significant and 
necessary in order to prevent miscarriages of justice. 
Moreover, Ruiz does not end the inquiry into whether or not Mr. Klein's guilty plea was 
infirm even though that is all the State addresses in its response. The district court held "there 
was no constitutional requirement to disclose Rice's prior inconsistent testimony." 
Memorandum Decision, p. 11. In his Opening Brief Mr. Klein set forth how Ruiz is not 
determinative in this case, stating, "the disclosure of Brady material is vital to ensure the 
voluntary and intelligent nature of a plea pursuant to a plea agreement." Opening Brief, p. 14. 
Such a proposition is not without support in the law. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that in 
certain circumstances the State's failure to disclose Brady material could give rise to a guilty 
plea being entered ignorant of such crucial facts that the plea may not have been knowing and 
intelligent. State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 434,885 P.2d 1144,1150 (Ct. App. 1994). Mr. 
Klein again raised the validity of his plea and whether it was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 
when arguing his prior counsel's complete failure to investigate the case constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Opening Brief, p. 26. 
Next, the State's argument that Mr. Klein was not prejudiced by the State's failure to 
disclose the information regarding Fred Rice fails for the same reasons the district court's 
Memorandum Decision was in error both misunderstand and grasp the significance of Rice's 
p. 204 - 217. Nevertheless, on direct appeal Mr. Klein is certainly permitted to argue and 
explain how the district court's reliance on Ruiz was in error and should be reversed. 
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proposed testimony and the necessity that he be considered credible. The State argues it still 
"had the option simply not to utilize Cpl. Rice or his reconstruction report. The state additionally 
possessed the separate report completed by Cpl. Bivins, which also found that Klein caused the 
accident by passing into Twitchell's lane of travel." Brief of Respondent, p. 11. Mr. Klein 
previously explained how this assertion completely misunderstands the reports of Bivins and 
Rice because in actuality they are inconsistent and contradict each other, therefore that 
explanation will not be repeated here. See Opening Brief, pp. 12 - 13. 
The State also argues Mr. Klein was not prejudiced because he somehow received a 
favorable plea bargain. Brief of Respondent, p. 11 - 12. A plea bargain for someone who most 
likely did not commit the crime charged is not "favorable." The State points out the Mr. Klein 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that he thought the plea agreement was fair at the time. This 
is true - at the time Mr. Klein did not know that Fred Rice's credibility as an expert witness was 
suspect and questionable nor that he very well may not have been the cause of the accident. See 
Exhibit 1. 
Finally, in arguing that Mr. Klein was not prejudiced, the State suggests its case was 
bolstered by additional evidence beyond Rice's report. Brief of Respondent, p. 12. In making 
this argument the State fails to address any of the finding and conclusions contained in the FDJ 
Accident Reconstruction Report that actually point out the numerous weaknesses in the State's 
case. Exhibit 1. 
With regards to the State's position that the Custer County prosecuting attorney was 
unaware that a district court in the State ofIdaho had found Fred Rice had given wholly opposite 
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opinions under oath, again, this argument lacks merit. First and foremost, implicit in the district 
court's Memorandum Decision is that the State was aware of this knowledge.2 
That being said, the State of Idaho was the party prosecuting the criminal action against 
Mr. Klein. The duty to disclose under Brady, applies not only to evidence actually known to the 
trial prosecutor, but also to evidence known to those acting on the State's behalf. The State 
knew of this evidence. Fred Rice was obviously aware he had offered wholly opposite opinions 
when he testified in the Ellington case in 2006. The Idaho Attorney General's Office, the chief 
law officer of the State ofIdaho, was put on notice on June 30, 2008, that Fred Rice testified to 
wholly opposite opinions when it was served with Mr. Ellington's Motion to Suspend the Appeal 
in State of Idaho v. Jonathan W Ellington, Supreme Court Case No. 33843. The Kootenai 
Prosecuting Attorney's Office knew that Judge Luster found Fred Rice incredible and umeliable 
in March 2009 when it was served with Judge Luster's decision. Finally, the Supreme Court's 
decision in State of Idaho v. Jonathan WEllington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727 (2011) wherein 
the Court concluded Fred Rice provided false testimony was issued on May 27, 2011, seven days 
prior to Mr. Klein's conviction becoming final. 
Because Mr. Klein established before the district court there was a reasonable probability 
that had the evidence regarding Fred Rice been disclosed to the defense the result of the 
proceedings would have been different Mr. Klein's conviction must be reversed. 
2 Should this Court find the State's knowledge or lack of knowledge determinative of this 
issue and find that the district court's Memorandum Decision does not implicitly make this 
conclusion, then this matter should be remanded for further factual findings and 
proceedings. 
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B. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Klein's Claim that He 
Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel when Mr. Klein's Counsel Failed to 
Timely File a Motion to Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
Mr. Klein's trial counsel unexplainably failed to file a motion to withdraw Mr. Klein's 
guilty plea prior to the district court loosing jurisdiction. As set forth in his Opening Brief, as a 
result Mr. Klein was the recipient of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Klein explained why 
the motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been timely filed and in failing to do so, trial 
counsel was deficient. Furthermore, there simply is no strategic reason or valid excuse not to 
timely file the motion when sufficient time to do so existed. The State argues in response that 
Mr. Klein's trial counsel was not deficient and that even if counsel was deficient Mr. Klein was 
not prejudiced by the deficiency. Mr. Klein will not rehash why trial counsel was deficient and 
instead will respond to the State's argument regarding prejudice. 
In order to establish prejudice, all Mr. Klein must show is a reasonable probability that, 
but for trial counsel's inadequate performance, the outcome of the proceeding before the district 
court would have been different. "Furthermore, in a post-conviction proceeding challenging an 
attorney's failure to pursue a motion in the underlying criminal action, the court properly may 
consider the probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether the 
attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance." Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158, 
857 P.2d 634, 637 (CL App. 1993). 
Had the motion to withdraw guilty plea been timely filed, it was likely Mr. Klein would 
have prevailed on that motion. Because Mr. Klein would have been withdrawing his guilty plea 
after he was sentenced, he would have needed to establish that doing so would have corrected a 
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"manifest injustice." State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 714 P.2d 86 (Ct. App. 1986). Even with 
that stricter standard applied, Mr. Klein would have likely prevailed. 
Again, there were no witnesses to the accident. Based solely upon the Rice Accident 
Reconstruction Report and his attorney's representations, Mr. Klein entered an Alford plea to the 
charge of vehicular manslaughter. Now however, there is "very strong evidence that Cpl. Rice 
perjured himself during the Ellington trial." State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727, 749 
(2011). According to the Supreme Court of Idaho, the State's proverbial star-witness is: 
[A] police officer with twenty five years of experience, who teaches accident 
reconstruction to other Idaho police officers and who has testified for the State on many 
other occasions regarding accident reconstruction, to the stand and ... testified falsely 
according to the well-established principles of accident reconstruction ... as well as his 
own testimony in the Ciccone case and his own training materials. 
Id There is no longer any way Fred Rice could be considered credible or reliable. In light of the 
circumstances, including the fact that Mr. Klein entered a guilty plea pursuant to Alford v. North 
Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), upholding a conviction relying solely upon a perjurer's report 
constitutes a manifest injustice and the motion to withdraw his guilty plea would have been 
granted had it been timely filed. 
C. The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Klein's Claim for Relief that He Received 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel when Trial Counsel Failed to Investigate the Case 
or Meaningfully Consult with an Independent Accident Reconstructionist 
The district court concluded trial counsel's conduct did not fall below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional performance. The district court also concluded there was no 
resulting prejudice from the alleged deficient performance. In his Opening Brief Mr. Klein 
detailed how the district court's conclusions were misapplications of the law to the facts 
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presented at the evidentiary hearing. In response, the State argues nothing beyond the district 
court's conclusions. The State fails to respond to any ofthe detailed facts demonstrating trial 
counsel's failure to conduct any sort of investigation in the case or consult with an independent 
accident reconstructionist in a meaningful way. Opening Brief, pp. 22 - 26. 
For instance, the State fails to even attempt justifying trial counsel's stopping at the scene 
maybe two times as an adequate investigation in a vehicular manslaughter case. The State makes 
no attempt to justify trial counsel's decision to not take any pictures or measurements, to not 
inspect either of the vehicles involved, to not inspect any of the physical evidence in the case, 
and to not research the history of the victim's vehicle. As detailed in Mr. Klein's Opening Brief 
- more is required of defense counsel. The information trial counsel would have learned had he 
retained an independent accident constructionist is alarming in light ofMr. Klein's guilty plea. 
Trial counsel admitted that had he known Rice's accident reconstruction report contained the 
significant errors it does - as Mr. Klein established at the evidentiary hearing - that his advice to 
Mr. Klein about pleading guilty would have been different. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Klein's Opening Brief, this Court should 
reverse the district court's judgment dismissing his post-conviction claims and remand this case 
for further proceedings. 
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Respectfully submitted this 4th day of March 2014. 
leffre 
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